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Abstract
This paper computes the welfare consequences, for a representative
agent, of a shift in the inflation target of monetary authorities. The
welfare computations are conducted first by comparing the two steady
states that the different inflation targets entail, and next by accounting
for the transition from one steady-state to the next. Further, the paper
allows this transition to be characterized by incomplete information,
under which private agents learn about the inflation target shift using
Bayesian updating. The analysis is repeated in a variety of model
parameterizations, to test the robustness of the results.
We find that the welfare benefits of reducing the target rate of in-
flation from 2% initially to 0% may at first appear to be significant.
When measured by comparing steady states, these benefits are worth
up to 0.5% of steady-state consumption. However, accounting for the
transition towards the new, low inflation steady state significantly re-
duces the computed benefits, by at least one half.
1 Introduction
Several central banks throughout the world now follow inflation targeting
policies. Overall, these policies have been accompanied by good economic
outcomes, and inflation targeting is generally deemed to be a success.
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Good governance dictates however that even successful policies ought to
be revisited periodically, and the pertinence of modifying them be analyzed.
In that context, a revision to the numerical target for the inflation rate
is perhaps the simplest and most natural change to an inflation targeting
policy that could be considered.
This paper provides such an analysis. Specifically, it computes the wel-
fare implications, for a representative agent, of lowering the monetary au-
thority’s inflation target from 2 per cent per annum to zero. The computa-
tions are performed within a standard monetary business cycle model, under
different scenarios regarding the transition following the implementation of
the new target. In particular, we compute how much the welfare compu-
tations are affected by assuming that economic agents do not observe the
target shift directly and learn about it using Bayesian updating.
The paper’s findings are as follows. We report that the welfare benefits
of reducing the target from 2 per cent to zero may appear to be signifi-
cant. When measured by comparing steady states, these benefits represent
a utility windfall equivalent of 0.26% of steady-state consumption in our
benchmark model, and up to 0.5% in some of the extensions we analyze.
However, accounting for the transition towards the new low-inflation steady
state significantly reduces these computed welfare benefits, by at least one
half.
The economic environment examined is drawn from the cash-in-advance,
representative agent, complete markets and monopolistic competition econ-
omy of Yun (1996).1 In such an economy, positive inflation discourages
market-related activities, distorting decision rules for consumption, work,
and investment plans. Lowering average inflation reduces this distortion
and therefore represents a welfare benefit for the economy.
Accounting for the transition towards the lower inflation steady state
reduces the computed welfare benefits for two reasons. First, the reduced
distortions do encourage and ultimately increase capital formation, but this
additional capital must first be accumulated, at the cost of postponed con-
sumption or leisure. Further, incomplete information may lead economic
agents to incorrectly interpret the high interest rates that prevail immedi-
ately after the shift as temporary monetary tightenings; in such a case, the
initial responses of consumption, employment and output may be different
1Apart from the cash-in-advance constraint, this environment is a standard represen-
tative of those in the New Keynesian literature. Other papers in this rapidly expanding
literature include Ireland (1997, 2001), Dib (2003, forthcoming), Erceg et al. (2000), Smets
and Wouters (2003), Ambler et al. (2003), and Christiano et al. (2005). A detailed expo-
sition of the model can be found in King (2000).
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from their long-term ones. Eventually as agents’ learning helps ascertain
the true nature of the monetary policy shift, these responses are reversed;
however, the early incorrect actions further reduce the welfare benefits of
the new low-inflation policy.
Quantitative analysis of the welfare costs of inflation can be traced back
to Bailey (1956)’s computations of the deadweight loss under the money
demand curve for different levels of inflation. More recent studies that use
similar logic include Fisher (1981) and Lucas (1981, 2000).
In contrast with the Bailey strategy, the present paper uses a fully-
developed general equilibrium monetary model to perform the computations;
this allows a more complete characterization of the effects of inflation on the
economy and on the representative agent’s welfare.2 Further, solving for the
path the economy follows in its transition towards the new low-inflation
steady state is straightforward.3
Earlier papers (Cooley and Hansen, 1989, 1991; Dotsey and Ireland,
1996; Wu and Zhang, 1998, 2000) also compute the welfare benefits of lower
inflation using a fully developed quantitative model as their measuring tool.
The present paper extends this earlier work by using a model from the the
New Keynesian literature, the standard in recent applied monetary analy-
sis. It further contributes to the set of available results by considering that
incomplete information may impair the transition towards the new low-
inflation target and providing a quantitative assessment of the welfare im-
pact of these impairments. To do so, the paper borrows from a literature
that examines the impact of incomplete information about the monetary
authority’s actions and objectives.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model, a representative of the New-Keynesian literature. Section 3 discusses
the calibration of the model, while section 4 presents the welfare computa-
tions and discusses them. Section 5 assesses these results and concludes.
2The present paper does not consider the possibility that inflation affects economic
agents differently. The work of Erosa and Ventura (2002) suggests that such heterogenous
impacts might be important when considering changing the inflation target.
3We use the method of first-order approximation around the steady-state to compute
this path, as implemented by King and Watson (2002).
4These learning effects are often used to explain the persistent responses of real vari-
ables following monetary policy shocks. See Andolfatto and Gomme (2003), Andolfatto
et al. (2002), Erceg and Levin (2003), and Schorfheide (2005). An earlier contribution can
be found in Brunner et al. (1980).
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2 Model
This section presents the model used to perform our experiments. We de-
scribe the optimization problem of households and firms, as well as the
policy rule followed by the monetary authority. In addition, we describe the
inflation target shift we consider, as well as the mechanism by which private
agents learn about this shift.
The model belongs to the new Keynesian class, the now standard method-
ological tool for applied monetary analysis. There are two sectors of pro-
duction. The final good sector is competitive: firms in this sector take
input prices as given, produce an homogenous good which they sell at per-
fectly flexible prices. The final good is divided between consumption and
investment. By contrast, intermediate-good-producing firms operate under
monopolistic competition. Each firm produces a distinct good for which
it chooses the market price. However, nominal changes to the price these
firms charge are restricted, following Calvo (1983), so that these prices are
‘sticky’. Intermediate good production requires capital and labour services,
for which the firms act as price takers. Finally, the monetary authority’s
policy rule manages the short-term nominal interest rate to respond to in-
flation deviations from its target, as well as to deviations of output from its
trend.
2.1 Household Sector
There exists a continuum of identical, infinitely-lived households with pref-
erences given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(c1t, c2t, nt), (1)
where c1t denotes consumption of the ‘cash’ good, c2t is the consumption of
the ‘credit’ good, nt denotes employment, and 0 < β < 1 is the households’
subjective discount factor.
At the beginning of period t, a household possesses Mt dollars of finan-
cial wealth (cash). The household receives a beginning-of-period per-capita
cash transfer Xt from the monetary authority. This transfer is related to
the authority’s management of the short term interest rate through its pol-
icy rule (described below). Further, the households receives a cash pay-
ment of Rt−1Bt, where Bt denotes the household’s detention of one-period
non-contingent bonds and Rt−1 is the (gross) interest rate on these bonds.
These sources of financial income must be sufficient to cover the household’s
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planned expenditure on the cash good c1t and on purchases of new bonds
Bt+1 i.e. assume the following cash-in-advance constraint:
c1t +
Bt+1
Pt
≤
M ct +Xt +Rt−1Bt
Pt
, (2)
where Pt is the dollar price of the cash good.
Households own the economy’s capital stock kt, which they rent to the
intermediate-good producing firms at the real rental rate rt. They also
supply labour services to these firms, at nominal wage Wt. Further, let
Dt denote nominal dividends the household earns through its ownership of
the intermediate-good producing firms and Γt a (fiscal) lump-sump transfer
from the government. These revenues, once any labour and capital income
taxes are netted out and any cash left over is added, must be sufficient to
cover the planned expenditures of the household. These include credit good
purchases c2t and investment in new capital it, as well as the financial wealth
the household desires to hold at the beginning of the next period (Mt+1).
Expressed in real terms, the following budget constraint applies:
Mt+1
Pt
+ c2t + it ≤ (1− τk)rtkt + (1− τn)
Wt
Pt
nt +Dt + Γt
+δτkkt + [
M ct +Xt +Rt−1Bt −Bt+1
Pt
− c1t]. (3)
The rate of income tax is denoted by τn whereas τk denotes the capital
income tax. Observe that the term in the square brackets above will equal
zero whenever the cash-in-advance constraint (2) binds.5
Investment it increases the capital stock over time according to
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it + [1− S(it/it−1)]it, (4)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant capital depreciation rate and [1−S(it/it−1)]it
summarizes the process by which current and past levels of investment in-
crease the available stock of capital. The function S is such that S(1) =
S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) ≡ κ > 0.6
The representative household chooses c1t, c2t, nt, Bt+1,Mt+1, it and kt+1
in order to maximize expected lifetime utility (1) subject to the cash-in-
5The presence of the term δτkkt in the budget constraint indicates that capital depre-
ciation allowances are taken into account by the model.
6Specifying that capital adjustment costs depend on past and current levels of invest-
ment follows Christiano et al. (2005).
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advance constraint (2), the budget constraint (3) and the capital accumula-
tion equation (4). The first-order conditions for this problem are as follows:
u1(c1t, c2t, nt) = λ1t + λ2t; (5)
u2(c1t, c2t, nt) = λ2t; (6)
u3(c1t, c2t, nt) = (1− τn)
Wt
Pt
λ2t; (7)
λ1t + λ2t = βRtEt[
λ1t+1 + λ2t+1
pit+1
]; (8)
λ2t = βEt[
λ1t+1 + λ2t+1
pit+1
]; (9)
λ2t
1− S( it
it−1
)− S′( it
it−1
) it
it−1
= βEt{λ2t+1[(1− τk)rt+1 + δτk
+
(1− δ)
1− S( it+1
it
)− S′( it+1
it
) it+1
it
]}; (10)
In these first-order conditions, pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross rate of aggregate
price inflation and λ1t, λ2t and µt are the multipliers for the constraints (2),
(3) and (4), respectively.
2.2 The final good sector
The final good, Yt, is produced by assembling a continuum of intermediate
goods yjt, j ∈ (0, 1) that are imperfect substitutes with a constant elasticity
of substitution θ. The aggregation function is defined as
Yt ≤
(∫
1
0
y
θ−1
θ
jt dj
) θ
θ−1
, θ > 1. (11)
The final good-producing firms behave competitively, maximizing profits
and taking the market price of the final good Pt as well as the intermediate-
good prices pjt, j ∈ (0, 1) as given. The maximization problem of a repre-
sentative, final good-producing firm is therefore
max
{yjt}1j=0
[
PtYt −
∫
1
0
pjtyjt dj
]
,
subject to (11). The resulting input demand function for the intermediate
good j is
yjt =
(
pjt
Pt
)−θ
Yt, (12)
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and represents the economy-wide demand for good j as a function of its rel-
ative price and of the economy’s total output of final good Yt. The no profit
condition in the sector implies that the final-good price index Pt satisfies
Pt =
(∫
1
0
pjt
1−θ dj
) 1
1−θ
. (13)
2.3 The intermediate good sector
The intermediate good-producing firm j uses capital and labor services kjt
and hjt to produce yjt units of its differentiated good, according to the
following constant-returns-to-scale technology:
yjt ≤ k
α
jth
1−α
jt , α ∈ (0, 1) . (14)
Each intermediate good-producing firm sells its output under monop-
olistic competition; the economy-wide demand for the good produced by
producer j is given by (12). Further, following Calvo (1983), we assume
that each firm is only allowed to re-optimize its output price at specific mo-
ments. Specifically, with probability φ the firm must charge the price that
was in effect in the preceding period, indexed by that period’s rate of ag-
gregate price inflation; with probability 1−φ, the firm is free to re-optimize
and fix a completely new price. This implies that on average the firm will
not re-optimize for 1/(1− φ) periods.7
At time t, if firm j receives the signal to reoptimize, it chooses a price
p˜jt, as well as contingency plans for hjt+k, kjt+k, for all k ≥ 0 that maximize
its discounted, expected (real) profit flows for the period of time where it
will not be able to reoptimize. The profit maximization problem is therefore
the following:
max
{kjt,hjt,epjt}
E0
[
∞∑
k=0
(βφ)kλt+kDjt+k/Pt+k
]
,
where Djt+k/Pt+k, the real profit flow at time t+ k, is
Djt+k = (p˜jt
k−1∏
s=0
pit+s) yjt+k −Rkt+kkjt+k −Wt+khjt+k. (15)
7This particular specification of the Calvo mechanism follows Christiano et al. (2005).
Alternatively, Yun (1996) assumes that when the re-optimization signal is not received,
the price is indexed by the average inflation rate. Smets and Wouters (2003) implement
a flexible specification that nests the two cases, and introduce an additional ‘indexation’
parameter.
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where φk expresses the probability that p˜jt remains in effect (including of
indexation) at time t+ k.
Profit maximization is undertaken subject to the demand for good j
(12) and to the production function (14) (to which the Lagrangean multiplier
ξt > 0 is associated). The first-order conditions of this optimization problem
for kjt, hjt, and p˜jt are:
Rkt
Pt
= αqt
yjt
kjt
; (16)
Wt
Pt
= (1− α)qt
yjt
kjt
; (17)
p˜jt =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
k=0(βφ)
k(
∏k−1
s=0 pi
−θ
t+s)λt+kYt+kqt+kP
θ
t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0(βφ)
k(
∏k−1
s=0 pi
1−θ
t+s )λt+kYt+kP
θ−1
t+k
; (18)
where qt = ξt/λt is the real marginal cost of the firm.
Because of the symmetry in the demand they face for their good (12),
all firms that are allowed to reoptimize choose the same price p˜jt, which we
therefore denote p˜t. Considering the definition of the price index in (13) and
the fact that at the economy’s level, a fraction 1 − φ of intermediate-good
producing firms reoptimize, the aggregate price index Pt evolves according
to
P 1−θt = φpi
1−θ
t−1P
1−θ
t−1 + (1− φ)(p˜t)
1−θ. (19)
Equations (16) and (17) state that firms choose their production inputs
so that their costs equal their marginal product weighted by the real mar-
ginal cost. Equation (18) relates the optimal price to the expected future
price of the final good and to the expected future real marginal costs. Tak-
ing a first-order approximation of conditions (18) and (19) and combining
them leads us to derive the model’s New Keynesian Phillips curve:
pit =
β
1 + β
pit+1 +
1
(1 + β)
pit−1 +
(1− φ)(1− βφ)
φ(1 + β)
q̂t, (20)
which relates the present period’s deviation of the inflation rate from its
average (pit) to the expectation of future rates, past values of itself, as well
as to the present period’s marginal costs (q̂t), an indicator of the strength
of economic activity.8
8Starting with Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), a sizeable literature has employed single-
equation econometric methods to estimate various specifications of the New Keynesian
Philips Curve.
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2.4 Fiscal Policy
The government rebates all its taxation revenues back to households in a
lump-sum fashion. We thus have the following equilibrium condition:
Γt = τn
Wt
Pt
nt + τk(rt − δ)kt. (21)
2.5 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority sets the net nominal interest rate it = Rt − 1
according to the following Taylor-type rule:
it = (1− ρ)[r
ss + piTt + λpi(pit − pi
T
t ) + λyŷt] + ρit−1 + ut, (22)
where rss denotes the steady-state real rate of interest rate (on a net basis),
piTt denotes the (net) inflation target of the monetary authority at time t, ŷt
is the percentage deviation of output from trend (the ‘output gap’), and ut
denotes a monetary policy shock. The parameters λpi and λy describe the
extent to which the desired interest rate reacts to deviations of inflation from
target and non-zero values of the output gap, respectively; in addition, the
parameter 0 ≤ ρ < 1 indexes the degree to which the monetary authority
wishes to smooth out interest rate movements; this parameter thus mea-
sures how fast the desired rate will be achieved. As mentioned above, the
monetary authority achieves any particular it with an appropriate lump-sum
injection/withdrawal of cash Xt to the household sector.
We interpret the monetary policy shock ut as the reaction of mone-
tary authorities to economic factors, such as financial stability concerns,
not articulated by the rule (22).9 We view these shocks as possessing lit-
tle persistence and accordingly, we assume that their evolution follows the
distribution
ut = ρuut−1 + et, (23)
with 0 ≤ ρu ≪ 1 and et ∼ N(0, σu).
2.6 Information Structure and Shifts in the Inflation Target
We consider two information structures, distinguished by whether private
agents can directly observe the inflation target piTt . First, complete infor-
mation means that private agents know the complete parameterization of
9Considering that control of it is achieved by manipulating the aggregate money supply,
these shocks could alternatively be caused by imperfect control of the monetary authority
over the growth rate of money supply.
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monetary policy (ρ, λpi, λy, ρu, and σu) as well as the inflation target pi
T
t . As
a result, they have sufficient information to compute the correct conditional
expectations concerning future monetary policy.
The assumption of complete information supposes that the monetary
authority is able and willing to clearly announce its inflation target as well as
any changes to it. However, such credible communication might be difficult
to achieve in practice. For example, although a new central bank head may
make a strong aversion for inflation known in public announcements, the
lack of precision of these announcements may leave private agents uncertain
as what they imply quantitatively for the inflation target. Agents might, as a
result, modify their beliefs about the inflation target of monetary authorities
only once several periods of lower inflation have been observed. More explicit
announcements of changes in the inflation target might also suffer, at least
initially, from similar credibility problems.
To capture the spirit of this information problem, we define incomplete
information as meaning that private agents cannot directly observe the in-
flation target piTt and instead must learn about it indirectly from observed
interest rate outcomes. To illustrate the signal extraction problem this cre-
ates, consider the following turn of events. Initially, the inflation target is set
to piH , a relatively high rate. Accordingly, the rule followed by the monetary
authority is:
it = (1− ρ)[r
ss + piH + λpi(pit − pi
H) + λyŷt] + ρit−1 + ut. (24)
Next, assume that at time t, the monetary authority changes its inflation
target to piL, where piL < piH . The rule is now the following:
it = (1− ρ)[r
ss + piL + λpi(pit − pi
L) + λyŷt] + ρit−1 + ut. (25)
Rewriting (25) by adding and subtracting piH two times, and rearranging,
gives:
it = (1−ρ)[r
ss+piH+λpi(pit−pi
H)+λyŷt]+ρit−1+(1− ρ)(1− λpi)(pi
L − piH) + ut︸ ︷︷ ︸
u∗t
,
(26)
Comparing (24) and (26) shows that from the perspective of a private
agent whose initial belief about the inflation target of the monetary authority
was piH , the observed shock to the policy rule u∗t is a combination of the
shift in the inflation target (1− ρ)(1 − λpi)(pi
L − piH) and of the transitory
shock ut. Specifically, u
∗
t can be expressed as:
u∗t = (1− ρu)(1− ρ)(1− λpi)(pi
L − piH) + ρuu
∗
t−1 + et; (27)
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where m1 ≡ (1− ρ)(1− λpi)(pi
L − piH) is the correct mean of u∗.
When complete information is assumed, private agents know the correct
mean of the shocks u∗t and thus the correct expectation about the path of
the interest rate. By contrast, incomplete information is characterized by a
situation where private agents have to learn and update their beliefs about
the mean of u∗t .
10
The information friction we assume is slightly different than in Andol-
fatto and Gomme (2003) and Schorfheide (2005), where the unobserved
inflation target has only two possible values. Such a restriction simplifies
the learning problem of economic agents and can imply a quick transition
of the beliefs following regime shifts. However, such a ‘two-point’ learning
problem may understate the severity of the information friction over mon-
etary policy faced by real-world private agents (Kozicki and Tinsley, 2001,
p. 165).
2.7 Learning
Note that the correct specification for observed policy shocks u∗t in (27) can
be written in the following regression form:
u∗t = xt
′m+ et, (28)
where xt = [1 u
∗
t−1]
′ and m = [(1− ρu)(1− ρ)(1− λpi)(pi
L − piH) ρu]
′.
Assume further that at time t, private agents have initial beliefs over m
represented by the following prior distribution:
mt ∼ N(m0, σ
2
uM), (29)
where M−1 is interpreted as the confidence private agents put into their
initial belief over m. Bayesian updating on the sequence of observed shocks
to monetary policy u∗t will lead to the following sequence of posterior distri-
bution of the beliefs:11
mt+k = (M
−1 +X′X)−1(M−1m0 +X
′Y), (30)
10One could also assume that private agents have imperfect knowledge about the coef-
ficients of the rule (λpi, λy, and ρ) and learn about possible shifts to those parameters by
repeated observations of the realized interest rate. Some empirical estimates of monetary
policy rules (Clarida et al., 2000) suggest that such parameter shifts have occurred over
the last few decades.
11see Hamilton (1994), chapter 12.
11
where X is the matrix form of the observations vectors xt and Y denotes
the stacked observations over u∗t . Note that as the confidence over the pri-
ors decreases (M−1 decreases), mt+k simply consists of the OLS estimator
applied to observed monetary policy shocks.
2.8 Symmetric Competitive Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate goods-producing firms make
identical decisions. The equilibrium of this economy consists in a sequence
of allocations {Yt, c1t, c2t, nt, it, kt}
∞
t=0 a sequence of prices and co-state vari-
ables {Wt, rt, Rt, pit, λ1t, λ2t, qt}
∞
t=0 and the stochastic process for the mone-
tary policy shock ut. These allocations, prices, and shocks are such that (i)
households, final good-producing firms, and intermediate good-producing
firms optimize, (ii) the monetary policy rule (22) is followed, and (iii) the
following market-clearing conditions are satisfied:
kt =
∫
1
0
kjt dj; (31)
nt =
∫
1
0
hjt dj; (32)
Mt = Mt; (33)
Bt = 0; (34)
Yt = c1t + c2t + it. (35)
3 Calibration and Solution of the Model
To conduct our experiments, we compute a first-order approximation of
the model’s solution around the non-stochastic steady-state, following the
method described in King and Watson (2002).12 Nominal variables such
as the price level and the wage rate are transformed so that they become
stationary. Numerical values for the model’s parameters are set by appealing
to direct evidence or in order that the computed steady state replicates
features of actual economies.
12Employing a first order (linear) approximation of the solution, rather than the recently
developed second-order methods (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004) should not bias our
welfare results. The policy changes we consider –a reduction in the inflation target of
the monetary authority– has first order effects on the economy and it is those first order
effects that our welfare computations are meant to take into account.
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3.1 Preferences and Technology
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency. Following Cooley and
Hansen (1995), the utility function takes the following form:
u(c1t, c2t, nt) = γlog(c1t) + (1− γ)log(c2t)−Bnt; (36)
This formulation of utility incorporates the assumption that labour is in-
divisible, as featured by Hansen (1985). As shown by Cooley and Hansen
(1995), combining (5)-(6), (8)-(9) and (2) yields the following optimization-
based money-demand equation:
ct
Mt/Pt
=
1
γ
+
(1− γ)
γ
it, (37)
where it = Rt− 1 denotes the net nominal interest rate between t and t+1;
(1−γ)/γ can thus be interpreted as the interest-rate elasticity of the velocity
of money demand. We set γ to 0.84, so that this elasticity is 0.20, the value
used by Cooley and Hansen (1995).
The rate of labour income taxation τn is set to 0.2 while that on capital
income taxation, τk, is 0.4. This follows Cooley and Hansen (1991) and
Lucas (1990).
The parameter θ, the price elasticity of demand for each intermediate
good, is set to 6. This value, standard in the literature, ensures that the
steady-state markup of price over marginal costs is 20 percent. The parame-
ter φ, expressing the probability that the nominal price of an intermediate-
good producer is not reoptimized, is set to 0.6. This implies that on aver-
age, prices are reoptimized every 1/(1−0.6) = 2.5 quarters, or around eight
months. The parameter κ, governing the severity of the adjustment costs in
capital accumulation, is set to 2. This value is close to the average estimate
from Christiano et al. (2005).
The remaining parameters, β, δ, B, and α are set to that the computed
steady state matches the following: a real interest equal to 4 percent per
annum, and investment to output ratio of 0.17, labour effort equal to 0.3 of
total available hours, and a labour income share in GDP equal to 60 percent.
These restrictions imply the following parameter values: β = 0.9854, δ =
0.0212, B = 1.9198, and α = 0.4. Finally, note that as written, the model
implies that the intermediate-good producers, who operate in a monopolistic
competition environment, exhibit positive levels of steady-state profits. To
satisfy the requirement that no positive economic profits are maintained in
the steady state, we introduce fixed costs of production, in a manner that
13
eliminates these profits in the stationary state.13
3.2 The Monetary Policy Rule
According to the rule in (22), the nominal interest rate reacts to the de-
viations of inflation from its current target (with a coefficient λpi), to the
deviations of output from its trend (λy), and to its own lagged value (ρ).
Calibrating these values is not straightforward, because the sizeable lit-
erature that estimates monetary policy rules uses a variety of specifications
that sometimes differ significantly from the one we have retained to express
monetary policy.14 Further, some values of the triple (λpi, λy, ρ) lead to non-
uniqueness (or non-existence) of stable equilibria in the model. We therefore
use this literature as a guide to select likely values for the parameters.
Starting with Taylor (1993), the literature has argued that a relatively
high response of interest rates to inflation (the coefficient λpi) was necessary
to avoid the possibility of self-fulfilling expectations. In that context, we
set λpi = 2.0. This value is only slightly higher than the one advocated by
Taylor and is in line with recent empirical estimates (Erceg and Levin, 2003;
English et al., 2003; Schorfheide, 2005).
The smoothing parameter ρ is 0.5, a value within the range of recent
empirical estimates (Erceg and Levin, 2003; Kozicki and Tinsley, 2003;
Schorfheide, 2005). Note these empirical exercises allow for the possibility
of within-sample regime shifts in monetary policy and are therefore com-
patible with our environment. We also set λy to 0.25, a value similar to
the one obtained by Erceg and Levin (2003). Finally, we consider that true
monetary policy shocks have no serial correlation and thus we fix ρu to 0.
Note that in our sensitivity analysis, we explore the consequences of using
different values for ρ, λy and λpi.
3.3 Learning Mechanism
Consider a reduction of piT , the inflation target of the monetary authority,
from piH = 2.0% per annum to piL = 0%. With incomplete information, the
mechanism (30) describes how private agents update their beliefs about the
composite monetary policy shock u∗t and their beliefs on the inflation target.
13See Christiano et al. (2005) for an illustration.
14Among other dimensions, the empirical estimates of rules differ on whether the esti-
mated rule is forward looking, as in Clarida et al. (2000) or reacting to current values of
economic variables, as in Taylor (1993), and whether it is obtained from single-equation
estimation (Erceg and Levin, 2003; English et al., 2003) or as part of a sytem-wide esti-
mation (Schorfheide, 2005; Kozicki and Tinsley, 2003).
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The prior belief m0 is set to [0 0]. This indicates that at the time of the
target shift, private agents consider that the inflation target is 2 percent and
that they correctly assign a zero serial correlation to the monetary policy
shock ut. The matrix M indexes the confidence agents possess for these
prior beliefs. We assume a diagonal form for M so that
M =
[
v1 0
0 v2
]
, (38)
where v1 and v2 express the confidence in the beliefs over the mean and
the serial correlation of u∗t , respectively. We fix v2 to a high value, which
shuts down the learning about this parameter. To assign a value to v1, we
follow the strategy of Erceg and Levin (2003) and choose v1 in order for
the learning behaviour of private agents to match some observed features of
recent disinflation episodes. Specifically, Erceg and Levin (2003) estimate
that during the recent US episodes where inflation was trending down, half
of the change in the (implicit) inflation target of the monetary authority
appeared to be incorporated in agents’ forecasts within one year. We thus
set the parameter v1 for our learning behaviour to roughly match this fact.
As a result of the shift, private agents observe a sudden increase in the
nominal interest rate (recall the form of the composite monetary policy shock
u∗t and the fact that λpi is greater than one). They must thus decide whether
the observed spike in interest rates arose from a temporary tightening of
monetary policy (a positive ut shock) or rather whether it indicates that the
inflation target of the monetary authority has been reduced.
Figure 1 illustrates the resulting evolution of private agents’ beliefs over
the inflation target. It shows that initially, a small weight is assigned to
the possibility that the observed u∗t resulted from a decrease in the tar-
get; agents’ beliefs decrease but slightly. Over subsequent periods, repeated
observations of positive values for u∗t lead to additional revisions and the be-
liefs about the inflation target converge smoothly to the correct, new value
of zero. As indicated above, it takes roughly four quarters for the beliefs to
reach a half-way point, at which the inflation target is thought to be 1% per
annum; it takes around 15 quarters to reach the three quarters mark, where
the target rate implied by the beliefs is 0.5% per annum.
3.4 The Economy’s Responses Following the Shift
Figure 2 presents the responses of the economy following the decrease in the
inflation target. First, the dotted lines indicate the new steady-state values
of the variables. As mentioned above, lowering average inflation reduces the
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distortion imposed on the market economy by the cash-in-advance constraint
(or more generally by the requirement that money must be used for certain
economic transactions). As a result, households increase their labour market
participation and hours worked. This allows production, investment and
thus consumption to be permanently higher in the new steady state. For
their part, inflation and nominal interest rates are lower by two percentage
points.
The full lines of Figure 2 illustrate the paths taken by the economic vari-
ables in their transition towards the new steady-state. The inflation target
decrease means that initially, nominal interest rates must increase. This
interest rate tightening sets in motion a period of reduced economic activity
that lasts for about four quarters. For example, this is approximately the
time it takes for output to reach back to its pre-shock level. From this point
on, the benefits of reduced inflation take hold and labour effort, consump-
tion, output and finally investment smoothly increase towards their new
stationary states.15
4 Welfare Computations
4.1 Benchmark Model
The welfare benefits that arise from the policy change are computed by com-
paring the expected lifetime utility of a representative agent living in the
stationary state where inflation is piH = 2.0% with that of another represen-
tative agent living in the economy where the switch to piL = 0% has been
implemented. Because differences in indirect utility are difficult to interpret,
we express the utility difference in consumption terms. This requires finding
the numerical answer to the following question: what percentage increase in
consumption would have made households indifferent between remaining in
the high-inflation economy at the initial steady state, on the one hand, and
living in the new, low-inflation economy, on the other? Mathematically, the
goal is to find µ that solves the following equation:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
[
(1 + µ)cH1 , (1 + µ)c
H
2 , n
H
]
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu[cL1t, c
L
2t, n
L
t ]. (39)
15The new steady state (the dotted lines) is computed separately from the transition
paths, which arises from the first-order approximation solution around the initial steady-
state. This provides a check on the quality of the approximate solution; in all of our
computations and for all variables, the computed transition never settles further away
than a distance of 1% from the new steady state.
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The left-hand side of (39) is lifetime utility at the initial, high-inflation
steady state, where consumption of both types of goods has been increased
by the factor µ, whereas the right-hand side of the equation computes life-
time utility in the new, low-inflation economy.
This utility comparison can be implemented by comparing only the two
steady states, in which case (39) reduces to the following
u
[
(1 + µ)cH1 , (1 + µ)c
H
2 , n
H
]
= u[cL1 , c
L
2 , n
L]. (40)
As mentioned in the introduction, this implicitly assumes that the transition
to the new, low-inflation steady state has been immediate and costless. In
what follows, we report results arrived at by using both (39) and (40).
Table 1 reports our benchmark results. The first column reports the
consumption equivalent µ when the comparison between steady states in
(40) is used. The table shows that lowering inflation from 2 percent to zero
implies significant welfare gains, of the order of 0.26 percent of steady-state
consumption. However, the next two columns, using (39) and therefore
taking into account the transition from the initial steady state to the new,
low-inflation one reduces these welfare benefits very significantly: the bene-
fits when the transition features complete information now amount to only
0.13% of steady-state consumption, which is just below 50% of what they
were in the steady-state comparisons; Further, assuming that information
is incomplete and Bayesian learning characterizes the transition further re-
duces the computed benefits, to 0.09% of steady-state consumption, or 35%
of what they were in the steady-state comparison.
These benchmark results show that the two reasons mentioned in the
introduction for why the transition should be taken into account are im-
portant. Even under complete information, the increased work effort and
decreased consumption required to accumulate the additional capital en-
tailed by lower inflation cuts the computed benefits by one half. Further,
accounting for learning about the new target, a potential result of a com-
munication or credibility gap, further reduces the computed benefits, to the
point where they only represent around one third of the figure obtained from
the steady state comparison.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
To explore the sensitivity of our results, we repeat the analysis above for
several alternative calibrations of the model. The results are reported in
Table 2. The rows of the table each describe the specific departure from
the benchmark calibration under study. As in Table 1, the first column
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indicates the welfare benefits of the shift in inflation target, when a compar-
ison between steady-states is employed. Meanwhile, the second and third
columns report the computed benefit as a percentage of what was arrived
at in the comparison between steady states. To facilitate comparisons, the
benchmark results are repeated at the beginning of the table.
The first panel explores whether the results are sensitive to the parame-
trization of the monetary policy rule. The table clearly shows that it is not
the case. While there are some slight changes in the computed welfare ben-
efits, neither the number arrived at in the steady state comparisons nor the
amount by which accounting for the transition reduces this number change
significantly. Note that what slight changes there are accord well with our
expectations. Specifically, increasing interest rate smoothing (from ρ = 0.5
to ρ = 0.75) prolongs the transition and thus reduces benefits. Second,
increasing the confidence in the prior belief (from v1 = 4 to v1 = 8) leads
agents to downplay the importance of target shifts and thus be slower to
recognize one when it happens: this prolongs the incomplete information
transition, thus also reducing benefits. Modifying the response to output
deviations (λy) has only marginal implications for welfare benefits. Finally,
increasing the response to inflation (from λpi = 2.0 to λpi = 2.5) lower only
very slight the computed welfare benefits.
The second panel of Table 2 explores whether more important changes to
the model, over specific modeling choices, has an impact on the benchmark
results (the extensions of the model are cumulative).
The cash-in-advance constraint
The first modeling change is to follow Christiano and Gust (1999) and
assume that the cash-in-advance constraint is modified in two ways. First,
current wage income is included, and second, investment is paid out of avail-
able liquid balances rather than on credit. This transforms the constraint
in (2) to the following:
c1t + it +
Bt+1
Pt
≤
M ct +Xt +Rt−1Bt
Pt
+ (1− τn)
Wt
Pt
. (41)
Although this modification removes the distortion inflation imposes on
labour market participation (as was the case in the benchmark model), it
replaces it by one where inflation distorts the incentive to accumulate capi-
tal. This arises because capital accumulation must be financed with liquid
balances.
Table 2 shows that this distortion is more costly to the economy, and
that reducing it by decreasing the inflation target yields more important
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welfare benefits: these are now worth 0.54% of steady state consumption.
Further, the table shows that the percentage by which these benefits are
reduced when the transition is taken into account is even more significant.
Notably, when information is incomplete, the computed benefits represent
only 18% of the benefits arrived at in the steady state comparison.
Habit Formation
The next modification is to incorporate habit formation in the model.
Following Christiano et al. (2005), this is done by modifying the utility
function such that it becomes the following:
u(ct, nt) = log(ct − bct−1)−Bnt. (42)
In this expression, the “credit good” c2 has been eliminated and the coeffi-
cient b indexes the extent to which the habit (represented by last period’s
consumption) influences the valuation of consumption streams. Following
the estimates of Christiano et al. (2005), we set b = 0.6.
Table 2 shows that this modeling choice affects both the benefits com-
puted at the steady state and also those that include the transition. Indeed,
in the steady state comparison, the reduction in the inflation target is now
worth 0.47% in steady state consumption, a number slightly lower than the
precedent. However, the reductions in benefits when the transition is taken
into account are now greater; in particular an incomplete information tran-
sition now produces welfare benefits that are only 18% of those that were
computed in the comparison between steady states. This arises because
the habit variable leads households to choose a much smoother path for
consumption in the transition, one that exhibits a hump-shaped pattern.16
Wage Rigidity
It is often argued in the literature that wage rigidity might be important
to generate persistence in the responses of economic variables, particularly
inflation, following monetary or technology shocks.
We thus follow Erceg et al. (2000) by assuming that households, like
the firms producing intermediate goods, are monopolistic suppliers of their
labour and that a similar friction prevents them from fully adjusting their
nominal wage every period. This partial adjustment of wages implies a sim-
ilarly smooth adjustment of the marginal cost relevant to the intermediate
good producers following shocks (one important component of this marginal
16This smooth, hump-shapes pattern of consumption is precisely the reason this feature
has been traditionally incorporated into dynamic models. See Christiano et al. (2005) for
a discussion.
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cost is the wage rate) and thus imparts further smoothness to the economy’s
response.17
Following this intuition, Table 2 shows that the transition costs are more
important, i.e. there is an increase in the discrepancy between the welfare
benefits when steady state comparisons are used and those that arise when
the transition is computed. The benefits with the incomplete information
environment now constitute only 15% of those computed without transi-
tion. Note however that the difference between the full information and
the incomplete information transition are reduced, as they were already in
the model with habit formation. As we introduce in the model additional
factors that are meant to impart smoothness to the responses of the econ-
omy to shocks, the full information responses to the target shift themselves
become very smooth and thus the difference between full and incomplete
information tends to be reduced.
Overall, Table 2 shows that our results are robust across model specifi-
cations. Both the welfare benefit arrived at in the steady state comparisons
and the extent to which this number is reduced when the transition is taken
into account exhibit fairly limited ranges across the parametrization or the
specification of the model. This suggests that the key message of the paper,
that the benefits of lower inflation are significantly lower than they might
at first appear in comparisons between steady states, is likely to be robust
to an even wider battery of model extensions.
5 Conclusion
This paper computes the welfare benefits of a reduction in the monetary
authority’s inflation target from two percent per annum to zero. Although
these benefits may appear to be significant when steady-state comparisons
are employed, the paper shows that taking into account the transition from
the initial, higher-inflation state to the final, low inflation one reduces the
computed benefits very significantly and at least by one half.
The welfare computations are performed using a standard version of the
New Keynesian Model, the main tool of modern applied monetary analysis.
The model contains several features of actual economies (income taxation,
various nominal frictions and adjustment costs, etc.) that increase the confi-
17See Erceg et al. (2000) for the details concerning the implementation of this extension.
A ‘Calvo’ parameter, similar to the one in the optimization problem of the intermediate-
good producers above, need to be calibrated: we follow Christiano et al. (2005) and fix it
to 0.6.
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dence that can be drawn from its welfare implications. A sensitivity analysis
reports that the results are robust to model specification. Specifically, this
analysis shows that the welfare estimates are contained within a limited
range and that the sharp discrepancy between the welfare benefits com-
puted by comparing steady states and those arrived at when the transition
is taken into account remains across model specifications.
Some important extensions to the present paper’s analysis should be
conducted. First, the model should incorporate open-economy features, to
verify that the influence of the exchange rate channel to monetary policy
actions does not modify the results. Second, the possibility that lower-
ing the inflation target of the monetary authority increases the economic
growth should be considered.18 Further, allowing for such features as down-
ward nominal wage rigidity or the zero bound for nominal interest rates,
which could affect the transitions towards the new steady state but also the
model’s implications for this steady state, would further strengthen the con-
fidence one can attach to our results. Finally, it is assumed throughout the
analysis that the friction giving rise to money demand (the cash-in-advance
constraint) is left unchanged by the inflation target shift. Since the shift
analyzed is modest, this assumption may not unreasonable. Nevertheless,
lowering inflation may affect the structure of monetary transactions and
these changes might be important.19
Overall however, our sensitivity analysis suggests that the key message of
the analysis –the benefits of lower inflation are probably significantly lower
than they appear in steady state comparisons– will be robust to model spec-
ifications.20 This result could be prove useful when larger and more complex
models, for which accounting for the transition is not straightforward, are
employed for analyzing choices over the proper inflation target.
18Some evidence supporting the latter conjecture is contained in Barro (1996). Compu-
tational experiments within fully developed models that allow for this possibility can be
found in Gomme (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), and Wu and Zhang (1998).
19In a limited way, introducing money through a preference for real money balances
in the utility function could allow the structure of monetary transactions to depend on
average inflation. A more complete analysis of how inflation affects the structure of these
transactions requires a complete model of monetary exchange; see Rocheteau and Wright
(2004) for such an analysis that includes comparisons between the steady state implications
of different values of average inflation.
20The welfare consequences of the transition only depend on the paths taken by con-
sumption and hours worked while converging towards the new steady state, and any
successful model is likely to exhibit similar paths for these variables to those featured in
Figure 2.
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Table 1. Welfare Benefits from Reducing Inflation from Two
Percent to Zero
Steady-State
Comparison
Complete
Information
Transition
Bayesian
Transition
Consumption Equivalent µ 0.26% 0.13% 0.09%
⋄ as a fraction of steady-
state comparison
— 0.499 0.353
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Table 2. Welfare Benefits from Reducing Inflation from Two
Percent to Zero: Sensitivity Analysis
Specification Steady-State
Comparisona
Complete
Information
Transitionb
Bayesian
Transitionc
Benchmark Case 0.26% 49.9% 35.3%
Panel A: Modifications to the Monetary Policy Rule
Higher response to inflation (λpi = 2.5) 0.26% 49.7% 33.4%
Lower response to inflation (λpi = 1.5) 0.26% 50.4% 38.3%
Higher interest rate smoothing (ρ = 0.75) 0.26% 47.2% 30.7%
No interest rate smoothing (ρ = 0.0) 0.26% 51.2% 41.3%
Higher response to output (λy = 0.5) 0.26% 49.8% 35.7%
No response to output (λy = 0) 0.26% 50.6% 37.9%
Higher confidence in prior (v1 = 8) 0.26% 49.9% 27.2%
Panel A: Alternative Modeling Choicesd
Investment and wage income in cash-in-
advance constraint
0.54% 33.2% 23.5%
Habit formation in consumption 0.47% 21.3% 17.7%
Partial wage indexation 0.47% 19.0% 15.0%
aMeasured as the consumption equivalent µ.
bMeasured as a fraction of number in comparison between steady states
cMeasured as a fraction of number in comparison between steady states
dThe modeling extensions are cumulative.
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Figure 1: Learning About The Inflation Target
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Figure 2: Transition Path Following the Inflation Target Shift
(Shock occurs at t = 5)
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